Andrews, Kristin (2022) Does the sentience framework imply all animals are
sentient?. Animal Sentience 32(17)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1737

Date of submission: 2022-06-28
Date of acceptance: 2022-06-30

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2022.431: Andrews on Crump et al. on Decapod Sentience

Does the sentience framework imply all animals are sentient?
Commentary on Crump et al. on Decapod Sentience
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Abstract: The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in
decapod crustaceans are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to markers that could increase
confidence in an animal’s sentience more generally. Some of the commentaries have already pointed
out that pain is only one kind of sentience (Souza Valente). It has also already been pointed out that
there are other criteria for pain that could be usefully added to the framework’s eight (Burrell). This
expansive thinking about criteria that can be used to increase confidence in sentience raisess the
question: in an expansive framework for evaluating sentience generally, will there be any animals we
could study where confidence wouldn’t be increased were we to use a general model of evaluating
sentience via marker frameworks? I consider how the general approach could increase confidence in
the sentience of animals such as C. elegans and Porifera.
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1. What can sentience frameworks do? The framework proposed by Crump et al. (2022)
helpfully transforms the animal sentience question from “are decapods sentient?” to “how
confident can we be that decapods are sentient?” Given the nature of sentience as a first
personal feeling that is not directly observable even in other humans, answering the old question
requires a satisfactory answer to the skeptical problem of other minds. Since such an answer
remains elusive, the first question isn’t one that can be usefully subject to scientific investigation.
The new question is. But it is important to be clear about what such a framework can and cannot
do.
Sentience tests built on frameworks like the one proposed are not designed to serve as a decision
procedure to sort sentient from non-sentient beings. Without a secure theory of sentience to
guide us, we cannot be confident that a lack of evidence for pain experience signifies a lack of
sentience more generally. We also can’t be confident in any claims that a marker is necessary for
sentience of any particular sort. The presence of the marker can raise our confidence. In the
target article’s sentience framework, so long as none of the criteria are deemed necessary for
the experience of pain, or so long as experiencing pain isn’t necessary for sentience, lacking a
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criterion wouldn’t be evidence against sentience. What frameworks like these offer are more in
the way of positive tests for sentience--new ways of seeing particular sorts of sentience.
2. Expanding sentience frameworks in two ways. While accepting the evidence Crump et al. present
in favor of decapod crustacean sentience, I think their approach could be expanded in such a way
as to increase confidence in the sentience of any animal whatsoever. This is for two reasons:
there are innumerable types of sentience, and there are innumerable, and growing, sets of
criteria for each type of sentience.
The framework presented in the target article, like other sentience tests, focuses on a particular
sort of sentience—pain. But, as has already been pointed out in Souza Valente’s (2022)
commentary, pain is only one kind of sentience. Pleasure, temperature sensation, perception,
color experience, dream experience, imagination, smell, hunger, touch, nostalgia for the past,
self-awareness, guilt, etc. are other forms of sentient experience, and these too only begin to
scratch the surface when it comes to the varieties of sentience we can already identify. In each
category of sentience we will be able to develop sets of criteria—markers—like the ones
identified by Crump et al. But their eight criteria are not the end of the story when it comes to
pain markers. As pointed out in Burrell’s (2022) commentary, we can already identify further
markers for pain in addition to the eight used in the framework, such as activity dependent
neuromodulation in sensory circuits. Burrell goes on to point out the limits of our knowledge
when it comes to human pain experience, but he expresses optimism that we can gain new
knowledge. This suggests that as pain science progresses, we will be able to add even more
criteria to pain sentience tests, thus expanding far beyond the eight provided in the current
framework.
This double expansion--into types of sentience tests for different varieties of sentience, and into
additional criteria for each type of sentience--promises (or threatens) to lead to an explosion of
positive tests for sentience. There is reason to suspect that with the expansion of sentient tests,
we will gain increased confidence in the sentience of any animal deemed worthy of investigation.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caenorhabditis_elegans_hermaphrodite_adult-en.svg
from Wikimedia Commons by K. D. Schroeder, CC-BY-SA 3.0

3. Increasing confidence in nematode sentience. To illustrate, consider the case of C. elegans, which
show flexible behavior, have short term and long-term memory, can learn through association
and through habituation, can integrate information from different sensory modalities, and can
choose to respond differently to different levels of intoxicating substances, “support[ing] the
view that worms can associate a physiological state with a specific experience” (Rankin 2004,
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R618). One might expect the framework to conclude an increased confidence in nematode pain
experience. As Irvine (2022) notes in her commentary, there is evidence of criteria 1, 4, and 7 in
C. elegans, offering “substantial evidence” on the basis of the guidelines of the framework. But
since criterion 2, integrated sensory processing, is deemed lacking and presumed central to
sentience, the evidence is disqualified by the authors. This move raises questions. Either the
framework sneaks in necessary conditions for sentience without arguing for them, or they take
criterion 2 as necessary for adequately fulfilling some of the other criteria (perhaps 7). Without
a secure theory of sentience, it is premature to deem any criterion as necessary, so the first way
of understanding the author’s move is not currently warranted. That leaves us with the possibility
that, given the redundancies between the criteria, we lack evidence of criterion 7 in C. elegans
given the lack of criterion 2. However, this move can be subverted given recent evidence in favor
of criterion 2 that comes from a recent study mapping the brain of C. elegans that argues in favor
of sensory integration and computation in that model (Brittin et al. 2021).
1. Nociception
2. Sensory integration
3. Integrated nociception
4. Analgesia: (a) endogenous (b) exogenous
5. Motivational trade-offs
6. Flexible self-protection
7. Associative Learning
8. Analgesia preference: (a) self-administer (b) location (c) prioritised

Eight criteria for pain sentience
(Crump et al., 2022, §2.2)

As Irvine notes, we see evidence that nematodes have criterion 1 (nociceptors), 2 (sensory
integration), 4 (responsiveness to analgesics), 7 (associative learning), and perhaps 8 (analgesia
preference) (as discussed in Irvine’s commentary). Given high confidence that nematodes have
even three of these markers, the current framework would conclude that there is substantial
evidence of sentience in nematodes.
But it doesn’t end there. We can go on, finding evidence by looking at different varieties of
sentience. Evidence of dreaming can be gleaned from sleep patterns, which were identified as a
marker of consciousness by the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness. C. elegans show sleep
patterns similar to mammalian ones (Spies and Bringmann 2018). Evidence of pleasure can be
gleaned from the existence of neuropeptides such as oxytocin and its homologues, following the
suggestion in Burrell’s commentary to expand the range of neurotransmitters that can serve as
evidence of sentience. The oxytocin homologue nemotocin, which has been identified in C.
elegans, plays roles similar to mammalian oxytocin, as it is implicated in learning and in mating
(Beets 2012) and regulates behaviors that promote the survival of infant larvae (Scott et al. 2017).
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4. Generalizing to all animals. Seeing how the expansion in criteria and tests can identify sentience
in animals often dismissed as candidates for sentience because of their low number of neurons
highlights the neuro-bias that often emerges in these discussions. If we set such a bias aside and
follow the general methodology outlined in the target article, we can only increase our
confidence in an animal’s sentience. And if there are hundreds or thousands of tests, odds are
we will find some evidence that will increase confidence.
Consider the simple yet fascinating Hydra who, like all Cnidaria, lack a centralized nervous system
and hence a brain, though they do have sensory and ganglion neurons. Hydra behaviorally sleep,
they have sleep-regulatory genes, responsiveness to neurotransmitters and hormones, and
hence researchers study them to gain insight into the evolution of sleep (Kanaya 2020). Or the
infamous sea squirts Styela plicata (a tubular tunicate that is attached to the seabed and is closely
related to sponges); they share with C. elegans their own oxytocin homologue, “Styela oxytocinrelated peptide” which has been found to regulate tissue contraction (Ukena et al. 2008). We
may even find markers in the sea sponge larva Porifera. After spawning, the emerging sponge
larvae demonstrate negative phototaxis as they find a location to settle, and their settlement
time is increased by the introduction of substrates into the environment (rubble and biofilm)
(Wahab et al. 2011). Will future research find evidence of motivational trade-offs between light
levels and rubble when it comes to selecting a place to settle?

Porifera- Generalized Amphiblastula Larva Settling.jpg from Wikimedia Commons by M. Readey, CC-BY-SA 3.0

The details matter, because they can show us how different animals are sentient, and can help
to map out differences and similarities in sentience patterns across species. Proposals to organize
the criteria, untangle the redundancies and weigh the significance of different criteria will
significantly aid in the project of mapping the sentience profiles of different species (as suggested
in the commentaries of Irvine 2022; Jablonka & Ginsborg 2022; Brown 2022). This is especially
important for welfare considerations, because in order to promote an animal’s wellbeing we
need to know what they can feel, and not just that they can feel. However, the general lesson to
extract from this brief set of examples is that there is a lot more evidence of sentience in the least
familiar animals. And if we accept that claim, perhaps it is time to accept as a working hypothesis
in the cognitive science of consciousness studies that all animals are sentient. This premise will
promote research into a range of sentience dimensions across the animal kingdom. If it
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encourages research on simpler models, it may hasten progress in developing a secure theory of
consciousness.
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